Monday, February 20, 2012

WWII Myths – Luftwaffe the tactical airforce

The Luftwaffe was supposed to be a ‘tactical’  airforce .As such it was very good at supporting the German army but could not have a ‘strategic’ effect on operations. If only the Germans had invested in 4-engine bombers they would have won the Battle of Britain ,they would have bombed the Russian factories and won the war easily... At least that’s what I’ve read in books and articles.

Do I agree ? No

In order to decide if the LW was a ‘tactical’ airforce we need to have a look at:

1.     Production of LW aircraft in numbers

2.     Production of LW aircraft in weight

3.     Composition of LW fleet

4.     Comparison with RAF’s Bomber Command

Let’s look at production. Here there is a problem regarding the way we count aircraft. A large number of ‘’fighters’’ were Ju-88 bombers used as night-fighters. The Bf -109 and the Ju-88 were also used as recon planes. So here I’ve added to the wikipedia bomber data the Ju-88 nighfighter and recon plane. Also did the same for the Bf-109 in the fighter table. The end result is :

1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
Bombers
3,244
4,007
5,161
5,854
5,284
Fighters
2,673
3,704
5,109
9,494
23,447
Ground Attack
603
507
1,249
3,266
5,596
Sum
6,520
8,218
11,519
18,614
34,327
% of Bombers
0.50
0.49
0.45
0.31
0.15
% of Fighters
0.41
0.45
0.44
0.51
0.68
% of Ground
0.09
0.06
0.11
0.18
0.16


Looking only at the number it’s obvious that bomber production dominates the other parts of the LW fleet. Even in 1943 when the percentage goes down to roughly one third if we take into account the cost of bomber planes vs fighters ( 2 engines vs 1 , larger and heavier etc) again the bombers are the no1 item.

A better way is to look at the weight of produced aircraft. Since bombers are larger and heavier it is a better indicator of the relative value of  LW production. I’ve used the same data as before but this time I multiply each type of aircraft with its standard weight (in kg,from Wikipedia). It may not be the most scientific way but it’s close enough:


1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
Bombers
27,243,908
35,169,130
46,480,454
55,588,060
52,254,726
Fighters
8,272,749
10,172,210
14,668,675
27,369,448
66,875,267
Ground Attack
2,900,430
2,433,420
5,732,460
13,496,580
19,813,883
Sum
38,417,087
47,774,760
66,881,589
96,454,088
138,943,876
% of Bombers
0.71
0.74
0.69
0.58
0.38
% of Fighters
0.22
0.21
0.22
0.28
0.48
% of Ground
0.08
0.05
0.09
0.14
0.14



 Now let’s have a look at the composition of the LW fleet throughout the war:  

May-40
June-41
July-42
May-43
May-44
Jan-45
SE Fighters
1,369
1,129
1,364
1,489
1,608
1,937
TE Fighters
367
153
127
152
277
41
Night-fighters
0
205
308
456
874
1,144
Medium Bombers
1,758
1,355
1,881
2,126
1,362
484
LR Bombers
21
71
79
282
44
Ground Attack
467
578
466
852
836
753
Total Combat
3,961
3,441
4,217
5,154
5,239
4,403
Bombers % of Total
0.44
0.40
0.46
0.43
0.31
0.12



The Bomber force makes up ~41% of combat strength in 1941-44. So it is undoubtedly the largest part of the LW.

So the LW was definitely not an airforce that spent the majority of its resources on fighters and ground attack aircraft. Instead it was the Bomber force that ate up most resources.

Now let’s compare with a ‘strategic’ force, the RAF’s Bomber Command.


May-40
June-41
July-42
May-43
May-44
Jan-45
LW-Medium Bombers
1,760
1,355
1,881
2,126
1,362
484
BC-Medium Bombers
598
576
448
327
123
220
LW-Long Range Bombers
21
71
79
282
44
BC-Long Range Bombers
56
208
912
1,390
1,620
Sum LW
1,760
1,376
1,952
2,205
1,644
528
Sum BC
598
632
656
1,239
1,513
1,840
Total Ratio (LW/BC)
2.94
2.18
2.98
1.78
1.09
0.29
4-engine ratio (BC/LW)
2.67
2.93
11.54
4.93
36.82



What the numbers tell us is obvious. During the period 1939-42 BC has few bombers and only a small part are 4-engine. The majority of its aircraft are comparable or inferior to the standard German types.

So at least for the first half of the war no airforce operating in Europe can be said to be ‘strategic’.

Conclusion: Throughout the war the Kampfgeschwader accounted for the largest part of the LW. For the first half of the war no other nation had as many bombers available. Only in 1944 is the Bomber Force reduced in order to shift resources and pilots to the fighter defenses. Even then a large (for German standards) 4-engine He-177 bomber force is built up.
Compared to the ‘strategic’ Bomber Command the LW had a substantial numerical advantage in the period 1939-42 and bombers with similar or superior capability. Only in 1943-45 do the Brits have sufficient numbers of heavy bombers to classify as a ‘strategic’ force.

Taking into account the information presented so far it is clear that the Luftwaffe was not a tactical airforce in the period 1939-43. Only in ’44-’45 does the Bomber Force become eclipsed by the fighters and ground attack aircraft.


Sources: Strategy for Defeat , The Luftwaffe data book , AIR 22 - ‘’Air Ministry: Periodical Returns, Intelligence Summaries and Bulletins’’ , Wikipedia

3 comments:

  1. "Taking into account the information presented so far it is clear that the Luftwaffe was not a tactical airforce in the period 1939-43. Only in ’44-’45 does the Bomber Force become eclipsed by the fighters and ground attack aircraft."

    Just a short comment: The label of "tactical airforce" isn't dependant upon the mix of bombers to fighters and ground attack aircraft. It is defined by its doctrinal role as defined by the leadership that built and used the force in war. The Luftwaffe's main role in war was in direct support of Army operations, thus it is a tactical airforce by definition.

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  2. You have a point about doctrine.However the LW did not have a single role of supporting the front line troops.The large number of bombers were used for bombing enemy concentrations, HQ and depots and city centers far behind the front lines. I cannot see how this is tactical, especially as no other airforce had such a power projection capability in the first half of the war.

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  3. Those bombers were old. Do 17? Maybe better than British but Brits needed only fighters in BoB. Later US joined them and together they built bigger strategic bombers while Germans tried with He 177 but too late. And with Hitler mistakes about diving... They were doomed.

    But i agree that Luftwaffe wasnt tactical force. Germans were in bad strategical position when it comes to airforce. Main problem was Goering, With Hitler of course...

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